Philosophy

Bacchini, F. (2015). A popperian approach to rational argumentation in applied ethics. Journal of Argumentation in Context, 4(3), 243-285.

Bacchini, F. (2021). Hunger as a Constitutive Property of a Culinary Work. Topoi, 40(3), 535-544.

Bacchini, F., Blečić, I., Dumouchel, P., & Muroni, E. (2022). Carving spaces: violence and the sacred. Giornale di filosofia, 3(1).

Birch, J. (2021). Refining the skill hypothesis: replies to Andrews/Westra, Tomasello, Sterelny, and Railton. Analyse und Kritik, 43(1), 253-260.

Birch, J. (2014). How cooperation became the norm. Biology & Philosophy, 29(3), 433-445.

Bucciarelli, M., Khemlani, S., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2008). The psychology of moral reasoning. Judgment and Decision making, 3(2), 121-139.

Ceva, E., & Ferretti, M. P. (2018). Political corruption, individual behaviour and the quality of institutions. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 17(2), 216-231.

Ceva, E., & Radoilska, L. (2018). Responsibility for reason-giving: The case of individual tainted reasoning in systemic corruption. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(4), 789-809.

Ceva, E., & Mokrosinska, D. (2022). Failing institutions, whistle‐blowing, and the role of the news media. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 39(3), 377-392.

Chiodo, S. (2020). Technology and anarchy: a reading of our era. Bloomsbury Publishing PLC.

Colombo, M., Bucher, L., & Inbar, Y. (2016). Explanatory judgment, moral offense and value-free science. Review of philosophy and psychology, 7(4), 743-763.

De Caro, M., Navarini, C., & Vaccarezza, M. S. (2024). Why practical wisdom cannot be eliminated. Topoi, 43(3), 895-910.

Dell’Utri, M. (2024). The Inextricability of Fact and Value. In Science of Valuations: Natural Structures, Technological Infrastructures, Cultural Superstructures (pp. 41-51). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.

De Monticelli, R. (2022). Towards a phenomenological axiology: Discovering what matters. Springer Nature.

De Monticelli, R. (2018). The paradox of axiology. A phenomenological approach to value theory. Phenomenology and Mind, 15, 116-128.

De Monticelli, R. (2020). Values, norms, justification and the appropriateness of emotions. In The Routledge handbook of phenomenology of emotion (pp. 275-287). Routledge.

dos Santos, R. (2015). Human Dignity: absolute and intrinsic value? CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS. International Journal of Philosophy, 1, 278–284.

dos Santos, R. dos. (2017). Kant e a metaética contemporânea. Studia Kantiana, 15(1), 67–86.

dos Santos, R. dos. (2023). Entre analiticidade e reciprocidade: Schönecker e Allison sobre GMS III. Studia Kantiana, 18(1), 29–42.

Engel, P. (2016). La philosophie comme science morale des raisons et des normes. In Les sciences morales et politiques (pp. 167-187). Hermann.

Engel, P. (2019). Les vices du savoir: Essai d’éthique intellectuelle. Agone.

Rubio, S. F. (2024). Ascriptivism, Norms, and Negligence. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 8: Non-Ideal Agency and Responsibility, 8, 126.

Figueroa Rubio, S. (2015). Expectations and attribution of responsibility. Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law/Revija za ustavno teorijo in filozofijo prava, (26), 111-128.

Figueroa Rubio, S. (2021). Objetividad de los deberes y razones para la acción. Notas desde el externalismo. DOXA. Cuadernos De Filosofía Del Derecho, (44), 521–541.

Finlay, S. (2019). Defining normativity. In D. Plunkett, S. J. Shapiro, & K. Toh (Eds.), Dimensions of normativity: New essays on metaethics and jurisprudence (pp. 185–220). Oxford University Press.

Finlay, S. (2006). Normativity, necessity and tense: A recipe for homebaked normativity. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaethics (Vol. 3, pp. 57–85). Oxford University Press.

Goëtzmann, M. (2021). The building blocks of social trust: The role of customary mechanisms and of property relations in the emergence of social trust in the context of the commons. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 51(4), 347–370.

Frezet, E., Goëtzmann, M., & Mason, L. (Eds.). (2022). Spaces of Law and Custom. Routledge.

de Prado, S. J. G. (2018). Relativism and the expressivist bifurcation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48(3-4), 357-378.

González de Prado, J. (2020). Dispossessing defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 101(2), 323-340.

Melis, G. (2023). Normative defeaters and the alleged impossibility of mere animal knowledge for reflective subjects. Philosophia, 51(4), 2065-2083.

Melis, G., & Monsó, S. (2024). Are humans the only rational animals?. The Philosophical Quarterly, 74(3), 844-864.

Moroni, S., & Chiffi, D. (2022). Uncertainty and planning: cities, technologies and public decision-making. Perspectives on Science, 30(2), 237-259.

Mulligan, K. (2009). Values. In R. Le Poidevin, P. Simons, A. McGonigal, & R. P. Cameron (Eds.), The Routledge companion to metaphysics. Routledge.

PIekarski, M. (2018). Two arguments supporting the thesis of the predictive nature of reasons for action. Studia Philosophiae Christianae, 54(1), 93-119.

Piekarski, M. (2022). Motivation, counterfactual predictions and constraints: normativity of predictive mechanisms. Synthese, 200(5), 352, 1-31.

Roughley, N. (2018). From shared intentionality to moral obligation? Some worries. Philosophical Psychology, 31(5), 736-754.

Roughley, N., & Bayertz, K. (Eds.). (2019). The normative animal?: On the anthropological significance of social, moral, and linguistic norms. Oxford University Press.

Roughley, N. (2019). Might we be essentially normative animals. The normative animal? On the anthropological significance of social, moral and linguistic norms, 1-37.

Roughley, N. (2019). Moral obligation from the outside in. The Normative Animal?: On the Anthropological Significance of Social, Moral, and Linguistic Norms, 214.

Roughley, N., & Schramme, T. (Eds.). (2018). Forms of fellow feeling: Empathy, sympathy, concern and moral agency. Cambridge University Press.

Roughley, N. (2018). The Empathy in Moral Obligation. Forms of fellow feeling: Empathy, sympathy, concern and moral agency, 265.

Roughley, N. (2016). Wanting and intending. Springer.

Silva, D. S. (2022). The abandonment of Australians in India: an analysis of the right of entry as a security right in the age of COVID-19. Monash Bioethics Review, 40(1), 94-109.

Silva, D. S. (2025). Where infectious diseases occur: Restrictive measures and the concept of place. Monash Bioethics Review, 43(2), 259-267.

Silva, D. S., Del Valle, S. Y., & Plank, M. J. (2025). Ethical considerations in infectious disease modelling for public health policy: the case of school closures. Interface Focus, 15(4).

Schmidt, T. (2016). Instrumentalism about practical reason: not by default. Philosophical explorations, 19(1), 17-27.

Schmidt, T. (2016). Accounting for moral conflicts. Ethical theory and moral practice, 19(1), 9-19.

Summa, M. (2020). Über normalität und abweichung: Ein responsiver ansatz. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 68(1), 79-100.

Szigeti, A. (2015). Sentimentalism and moral dilemmas. dialectica, 69(1), 1-22.

Szigeti, A. (2013). No need to get emotional? Emotions and heuristics. Ethical theory and moral practice, 16(4), 845-862.

Szutta, N. (2020). The virtues of will-power–from a philosophical & psychological perspective. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 23(2), 325-339.

Szutta, N. (2019). Exemplarist moral theory–some pros and cons. Journal of Moral Education, 48(3), 280-290.

Tiefensee, C. (2016). Inferentialist metaethics, bifurcations and ontological commitment. Philosophical Studies, 173(9), 2437-2459.

Turner, S. P. (2010). Explaining the normative. Polity.

Yaegashi, T., & Uemura, G. (2020). Otaka Tomoo’s Conception of Sovereignty as Nomos: A Phenomenological Interpretation. In Tetsugaku companion to phenomenology and Japanese philosophy (pp. 131-145). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Uemura, G., & Salice, A. (2018). Motives in Experience: Pfänder, Geiger, and Stein. In Phenomenology and experience (pp. 129-149). Brill.

Zaibert, L., & Smith, B. (2007). The varieties of normativity: An essay on social ontology. In Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology (pp. 157-173). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.

Zuolo, F. (2020). Cooperation with animals? What is and what is not. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 33(2), 315-335.

Benoist, J. (2003). Quand’è che smettiamo di giocare ad un gioco? In P. Di Lucia (Ed.), Ontologia sociale: potere deontico e regole costitutive (pp. 191–196). Quodlibet.

Benoist, J. (2007). Un concept normatif de l’intentionalité?. Études phénoménologiques, 23(45/48), 9-36.

Benoist, J. (2005). Du bon usage de la structure: descriptivisme versus normativisme. Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 45(1), 41-56.

Calafiore, A., Boella, G., Borgo, S., & Guarino, N. (2017). Urban artefacts and their social roles: towards an ontology of social practices. In Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs (Vol. 86, pp. 1-13). Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing.

Bassetti, C., Blanzieri, E., Borgo, S., & Marangon, S. (2022). Towards socially-competent and culturally-adaptive artificial agents: Expressive order, interactional disruptions and recovery strategies. Interaction Studies, 23(3), 469-512.

Burman, Å. (2024). Two Types of Social Norms. Analyse & Kritik, 46(1), 25-36.

Burman, Å. (2023). Nonideal social ontology: The power view. Oxford University Press.

De Caro, M. (2020). The indispensability of the manifest image. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 46(2), 162-172.

De Caro, M. (2022). Liberal naturalism: origins and prospects. In The Routledge handbook of liberal naturalism (pp. 205-217). Routledge.

De Vecchi, F. (2016). A priori of the Law and Values in the Social Ontology of Wilhelm Schapp and Adolf Reinach. In The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems (pp. 279-316). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

De Vecchi, F. (2020). Proxy social-speech acts: A particular case of plural agency. Language & Communication, 71, 149-158.

De Vecchi, F. (2020). The intentionality and positionality of spontaneous acts: Adolf Reinach’s account of agency. In The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency (pp. 53-66). Routledge.

Di Lucia, P. (2020). Deviation without contradiction in Adolf Reinach’s Ontology. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Iuridica, (90), 15-27.

Di Lucia, P., & Fittipaldi, E. (Eds.). (2021). Revisiting Searle on Deriving” ought” from” is”. Springer Nature.

Di Lucia, P. U. M., & Passerini Glazel, L. (2017). Norm: What Is It? Ontological and Pragmatical Perspectives. Phenomenology and Mind, 2017(13).

Finlay, S. (2010). Recent work on normativity. Analysis, 70(2), 331-346.

Ginsborg, H. (2018). Normativity and Concepts, in D. Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (989-1014). Oxford Academic

Ginsborg, H. (2015). The normativity of nature: Essays on Kant’s critique of judgement. Oxford University Press.

Muldoon, R., Lisciandra, C., & Hartmann, S. (2014). Why are there descriptive norms? Because we looked for them. Synthese, 191(18), 4409-4429.

de Wit, J. R., & Lisciandra, C. (2021). Measuring norms using social survey data. Economics & Philosophy, 37(2), 188-221.

Loddo, O. G. (2025). Regulatory digital artefacts: digital regulation with and without rules. International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 33, eaaf016.

Lorini, G. (2019). Corporeal drawn norms. An investigation of graphic normativity in the material world of everyday objects. Phenomenology and Mind, 17, 80-90.

Lorini, G., Moroni, S. (2026). Normative Information. Bridging Information Theory and the Philosophy of Normativity. Philosophy and Technology. 39(103), 1-20.

Lorini, G., & Moroni, S. (2020). Ruling without rules: Not only nudges. Regulation beyond normativity. Global Jurist, 20(3), 20190051.

Lorini, G., & Moroni, S. (2020). How to make norms with drawings: An investigation of normativity beyond the realm of words. Semiotica, 2020(233), 55-76.

Lorini, G., & Moroni, S. (2022). Rule‐free regulation: Exploring regulation ‘without rules’ and apart from ‘deontic categories’. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 52(1), 22-36.

Lorini, G., & Moroni, S. (2022). Non‐Propositional Regulation. Philosophical Investigations, 45(4), 512-527.

Lorini, G., & Moroni, S. (2024). Rules without regulation and regulation without rules. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 54(2), 216-228.

Lorini, G., Moroni, S., & Loddo, O. G. (2021). Deontic artifacts. Investigating the normativity of objects. Philosophical Explorations, 24(2), 185-203.

Maynard, P. (2005). Drawing distinctions: the varieties of graphic expression. Cornell University Press.

Maynard, P. (2017). Drawn norms: The example of traffic signs. Verità, immagine, normatività: Truth, image, and normativity.(Analisi filosofiche), 327-352.

Maynard, P. (2019). Rules: A toy box. Phenomenology and Mind, (17), 94-111.

Mulligan, K. (2016). Persons and acts–Collective and social. From ontology to politics. In The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems (pp. 17-45). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Piekarski, M., & Wachowski, W. (2018). Artefacts as Social Things: Design-Based Approach to Normativity. Techne: Research in Philosophy & Technology, 22(3).

Raspa, V. (2012). Sollen: il dover essere è un oggetto? Le riposte di Meinong e Veber. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia del Diritto, serie V (2), 239-262

Ruben, D. H. (2014). The Limits of Realism in the Philosophy of Social Science. In New Directions in the Philosophy of Science (pp. 313-322). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Ruben, D. H. (2022). Multifunctional Artefacts and Collocation.

Satne, G., & Ainbinder, B. (2019). Normativity with a Human Face: Placing Intentional Norms and Intentional Agents back in Nature. In Normativity, Meaning, and the Promise of Phenomenology (pp. 174-194). Routledge.

Satne, G., & Salice, A. (2020). Shared intentionality and the cooperative evolutionary hypothesis. In Minimal cooperation and shared agency (pp. 71-92). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Smith, B., Loddo, O. G., & Lorini, G. (2020). On credentials. Journal of Social Ontology, 6(1), 47-67.

Zaibert, L. A. (2003). Collective intentions and collective intentionality. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 62(1), 209-232.

Aguilera, M. (2019). Pictures, content, and normativity: The semantic of graphic rules. Phenomenology and Mind, (17), 136-149.

Chiffi, D., & Pietarinen, A. V. (2020). On the logical philosophy of assertive graphs. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 29(4), 375-397.

Di Lucia, P., & Conte, A. G. (2009). Pragmatic ambiguity: the thetic function of modality. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics, 5(2), 191-199.

Finlay, S. (2014). Confusion of tongues: A theory of normative language. Oxford University Press.

Giromini, J. (2019). Determinate attitudes and indeterminate norms. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 49(3), 369-386.

Incampo, A. (2020). Pragmatica filosofica in Amedeo G. Conte. Rivista di filosofia del diritto, 9(1), 27-36.

Lo Presti, P (2017). Speaking about the normativity of meaning. SATS, 18(1), 55.

Marsili, N. (2023). The norm of assertion: a ‘constitutive’rule?. Inquiry, 66(5), 799-820.

Marsili, N. (2023). Towards a unified theory of illocutionary normativity. In Sbisà on speech as action (pp. 165-193). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Marsili, N., & Green, M. (2021). Assertion: A (partly) social speech act. Journal of Pragmatics, 181, 17-28.

Mulligan, K. (2021). Speaking – Maxims, Norms and Values. Ad Placitum. Pour Irène Rosier-Catach, 503-510

Berio, L., & Musholt, K. (2023). How language shapes our minds: On the relationship between generics, stereotypes and social norms. Mind & Language, 38(4), 944-961.

Ruben, D. H. (2022). Reply to ‘attempts’: a non-davidsonian account of trying sentences. Philosophical Studies, 179(12), 3817-3830.

Salis, P. (2019). Does language have a downtown? Wittgenstein, Brandom, and the game of “giving and asking for reasons”. Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin, 8(9).

Steinberger, F. (2019). Three ways in which logic might be normative. The Journal of Philosophy, 116(1), 5-31.

Steinberger, F. (2019). Logical pluralism and logical normativity. Philosophers’ Imprint, 19(12), 1-19.

Tiefensee, C., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2021). Metasemantics for the relaxed. Oxford studies in metaethics, 16, 108-33.

Witek, M. (2015). Mechanisms of illocutionary games. Language & Communication, 42, 11-22.

Witek, M. (2021). Illocution and accommodation in the functioning of presumptions. Synthese, 198(7), 6207-6244.

Witek, M. (2019). Coordination and norms in illocutionary interaction. Normativity and variety of speech actions, 66-98.

Birch, J. (2021). The skilful origins of human normative cognition. Analyse & Kritik, 43(1), 191–202.

Birch, J. (2021b). Toolmaking and the evolution of normative cognition. Biology & Philosophy, 36.

Chiodo, S. (2020). The greatest epistemological externalisation: Reflecting on the puzzling direction we are heading to through algorithmic automatisation. AI & Society, 35, 431–440.

Chiodo, S. (2018). Come pensa un europeo. Epistemologia di un agire comune. Carocci.

Colombo, M. (2014). Two neurocomputational building blocks of social norm compliance. Biology & Philosophy, 29, 71–88.

Colombo, M., Strangmann, K., Houkes, L., Kostadinova, Z., & Brandt, M. J. (2021). Intellectually humble, but prejudiced people. A paradox of intellectual virtue. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 12, 353–371.

Dell’Utri, M. (2024). Plain alethic pluralism: The human face of truth. Synthese, 204, Article 41.

Dell’Utri, M. (2023). Why post-truth cannot be our epistemological compass. Social Epistemology, 37(2), 164–176.

Dell’Utri, M. (2024a). Hilary Putnam’s philosophical naturalism: Making philosophy matter for life. Lexington Books

Engel, P. (2013). In defence of normativism about the aim of belief. In T. Chan (Ed.), The aim of belief (pp. 32–63). Oxford University Press.

Engel, P. (2014). The norm of truth: A dialogue. In F. Bacchini, S. Caputo, & M. Dell’Utri (Eds.), New frontiers in truth (pp. 1–14). Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Hofmann, F. (2025). The norm of reasoning. Philosophical Explorations, 28(1), 14–31.

Hofmann, F. (2021). Is evidence normative? Philosophia, 49(2), 667–684.

Hofmann, F. (2021). Two norms of intention: A vindication of Williamson’s knowledge-action analogy. Acta Analytica, 36(4), 563–572.

Kalpokas, D. E. (2017). Experience and justification: Revisiting McDowell’s empiricism. Erkenntnis, 82(4), 715–738.

Lo Presti, P. (2019). Conceptual confusions and causal dynamics. Phenomenology and Mind, 17, 32–43.

Melis, G. (2014). Understanding undermining defeat. Philosophical Studies, 170(3), 433–442.

Melis, G. (2018). The intertwinement of propositional and doxastic justification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 96(2), 367–379.

Melis, G. (2020). How many normative notions of rationality? A critical study of Wedgwood’s The Value of Rationality. Analysis, 80(1), 174–185.

Melis, G., & Blakey, K. H. (2026). Epistemic rationality begins unreflectively. Erkenntnis, 91(4), 1989–2012.

Mulligan, K. (2017). Incorrect emotions in ancient, Austrian & contemporary philosophy. Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, 142(4), 491–512.

Piekarski, M. (2019). Normativity of predictions: A new research perspective. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, Article 1710.

Raspa, V. (2015). Contraddizione, pensabilità, impossibilità. In P. Di Lucia & S. Colloca (Eds.), L’impossibilità normativa (pp. 127–148). LED.

Raspa, V. (1999). In-contraddizione. Il principio di contraddizione alle origini della nuova logica. Parnaso.

Roughley, N. (2016). Expressive explication and the optative mode. In Wanting and intending: Elements of a philosophy of practical mind (pp. 81–115). Springer.

Ruben, D.H. (2013). Traditions and true successors. Social Epistemology, 27(1), 32–46.

Salis, P. (2019). Anaphoric deflationism, primitivism, and the truth property. Acta Analytica, 34(1), 117–134.

Salis, P. (2019). Implicit norms. Phenomenology and Mind, 17, 56–68.

Satne, G. (2021). Collective intentionality, inferentialism and the capacity for claim-making. In L. Koreň, H. B. Schmid, P. Stovall, & L. Townsend (Eds.), Groups, norms and practices: Essays on inferentialism and collective intentionality (pp. 99–118). Springer.

Schiaffonati, V. (2022). Explorative experiments: A paradigm shift to deal with severe uncertainty in autonomous robotics. Perspectives on Science, 30(2), 284–304.

Steinberger, F. (2019). Accuracy and epistemic conservatism. Analysis, 79(4), 658–669.

Schroeter, L., & Schroeter, F. (2014). Normative concepts: A connectedness model. Philosophers’ Imprint, 14(25), 1–26.

Schroeter, L., & Schroeter, F. (2013). Normative realism: Co-reference without convergence? Philosophers’ Imprint, 13(13), 1–24.

Summa, M. (2014). Normalità o processi di normalizzazione? Le analisi husserliane sulla dimensione orto-estetica e il carattere dinamico dell’esperienza percettiva. Paradigmi, 32(3), 73–90.

Summa, M. (2019). Are fictional emotions genuine and rational? Phenomenological reflections on a controversial question. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 17, 246–268.

Szutta, N. (2014). Is Aristotelian concept of phronesis empirically adequate? (ATINER’s Conference Paper Series No. PHI2014-1108). Athens Institute for Education and Research.

Uemura, G. (2015). Husserl’s conception of cognition as an action: An inquiry into its prehistory. In M. Ubiali & M. Wehrle (Eds.), Feeling and value, willing and action (pp. 119–137). Springer.